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Abstract
Background: As the human cost of the global economic crisis becomes apparent the ongoing discussions
surrounding the post-2015 global development framework continue at a frenzied pace. Given the scale and scope
of increased globalization moving forward in a post-Millennium Development Goals era, to protect and realize
health equity for all people, has never been more challenging or more important. The unprecedented nature of
global interdependence underscores the importance of proposing policy solutions that advance realizing global
responsibility for global health.
Discussion: This article argues for advancing global responsibility for global health through the creation of a Global
Fund for Health. It suggests harnessing the power of the exceptional response to the combined epidemics of AIDS,
TB and Malaria, embodied in the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, to realize an expanded,
reconceptualized Global Fund for Health. However this proposal creates both an analytical quandary embedded in
conceptual pluralism and a practical dilemma for the scope and raison d’etre of a new Global Fund for Health. To
address these issues we offer a logical framework for moving from conceptual pluralism in the theories supporting
global responsibility for health to practical agreement on policy to realize this end. We examine how the
innovations flowing from this exceptional response can be coupled with recent ideas and concepts, for example a
global social protection floor, a Global Health Constitution or a Framework Convention for Global Health, that share
the global responsibility logic that underpins a Global Fund for Health.
Conclusions: The 2014 Lancet Commission on Global Governance for Health Report asks whether a single global
health protection fund would be better for global health than the current patchwork of global and national social
transfers. We concur with this suggestion and argue that there is much room for practical agreement on a Global
Fund for Health that moves from the conceptual level into policies and practice that advance global health. The
issues of shared responsibility and mutual accountability feature widely in the post-2015 discussions and need to
be addressed in a coherent manner. Our article argues why and how a Global Fund for Health effectuates this, thus
advancing global responsibility for global health.
Keywords: Global Fund to Fights AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria, Global Fund for Health, Development Assistance
for Health, Global Health
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Background
The impact of the global economic crisis on the health
of the most vulnerable people of the world has become
starkly apparent [1], and a matter of increasingly urgent
concern. Given the scale and scope of the current situation and the process of moving forward in a postMillennium Development Goals era, protecting and
realizing health for all people has never been more
challenging or more important. Global initiatives are
ongoing that are taking on this challenge [2]. The crisis
and current situation illustrates an unprecedented global interdependence and underscores the global responsibility for global health.
Until now, global responsibility in global health and
practical policy responses such as the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)
model have been driven in great part by the perceived
exceptionality of the combined epidemic of AIDS, TB
and Malaria, and an accepted global responsibility to
turn the tide of this epidemic. This exceptionality is
now being questioned, and as a result, so is the
global responsibility. This elucidates why some donor
countries proposed caps on future grant rounds; there
is a growing reluctance of rich countries to mobilize
resources.
This article argues that there are alternatives to the exceptionality of the combined epidemic of AIDS, TB and
Malaria, alternatives that also support the idea of global
responsibility for health, and a Global Fund For Health
expressing this global responsibility. However, these alternatives typically ground global responsibility for
health realized practically through a Global Fund for
Health in only single theoretical concepts: “political realism” [3] or “the right to health” [1], to highlight a few
and do not support a Global Fund for Health with a
mandate limited to three diseases. This creates both an
analytical quandary embedded in conceptual pluralism
and a practical dilemma for the scope and raison d’etre
of the GFATM. Analytically, at first glance it is difficult
to see how to construct practical policies out of seemingly intractable conceptual variety. In this article, therefore, we provide something that is missing in the
theoretical space in global health: a logical framework
that allows moving from conceptual pluralism in theories supporting global responsibility for health to practical
agreement on policy to realize this end. Practically, the
problem for the GFATM is that its mandate and rasion
d’etre are in question and it might not have the resources needed to embrace a wider set of responsibilities. UNAIDS Executive Director Michel Sidibé echoes
this concern stating that “the international community
cannot afford to sustain the current architecture for
AIDS and global health in the coming years” [4]. This
article argues that if the GFATM continues to ground its
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‘raison d’etre’ on the exceptionality of the combined epidemic of AIDS, TB and Malaria, it risks going down together with the fall of this exceptionality. To respond to
these challenges we propose a solution: embrace a wider
mandate, and a reformulated raison d’etre, one that is
grounded in broader notions of global responsibility for
global health, and become a Global Fund for Health.
While it is not within the scope of this article to suggest
the practical means necessary for realigning the preferences and commitments of the various stakeholders in
global health governance to establish a Global Fund for
Health, we demonstrate that it is in principle possible to
move from conceptual pluralism in this matter to practical agreement on policy.

Discussion
Global responsibility and global health

In recent years, ideas and concepts of global responsibility
for global health have been put forward, resulting in conceptual pluralism around this theme: a ‘world social health
insurance’ [5, 6]; ‘globalisation of social protection’ [7–9]
or a ‘global social protection floor’ [10]; ‘health security’,
understood as the health components of ‘human security’
[11, 12]; a ‘provincial globalism’ theory of ‘global health
justice’ [13, 14], encompassing universal coverage of
comprehensive efforts to improve health and integrating
aspects of human rights, protection and security [15]; a
‘framework convention on global health’ [16]; a new ‘Monterrey consensus’ to engage emerging powers in shared
responsibility for development [17]; ‘shared health governance’ and a “global health constitution’ [18, 19], to mention a few. This article argues for moving these concepts
into policy and practice.

Moving from conceptual pluralism to practical agreement
on policy

Whether one starts from the concept of human rights,
global social protection, or human security, when moving
from concepts to practice, it is possible to obtain practical
agreement on policy options, without attenuating the fundamental differences between these concepts. To make
this case, we adopted Jennifer Prah Ruger’s idea of ‘incomplete theorisation in health’. It may very well be possible,
Ruger argues, to completely theorize a particular policy,
program, proposal, or intervention all the way from high
level values to low level particulars. But more often than
not, agreement is possible at one or more levels and on
one or more dimensions, without agreement on other
levels or dimensions [20].
In recent years various global health initiatives including horizontal initiatives (focusing on health systems),
vertical interventions (targeting specific diseases like
HIV/AIDS) and vertical-horizontal combinations have
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attempted to improve global health outcomes. But the
multiplicity of actors on the global health stage has resulted in inefficiencies which fail to address and even
perpetuate inequity in health outcomes. Acknowledging
the impact of poor coordination in improving outcomes,
the International Health Partnership and related initiatives (IHP+) seeks to achieve better health results by
harmonizing bilateral donors and other development
partners around a single country-led national health
‘compact’ [21]. We support this move towards
harmonization of Development Assistance for Health
(DAH), but argue that there is a need to go further and
to address the architecture itself, practical agreement on
the need for a Global Fund for Health, as one of the best
policy options for global health, is possible. Figure 1 illustrates this. We will briefly explain each of the 10 linkages
in this figure. Linkages one through five demonstrate how
each of the concepts supporting global responsibility for
health leads to essential features of a better DAH architecture. Linkages six to ten show how these essential features
lead to the creation of a Global Fund for Health, as a
cornerstone of the DAH architecture.
For the first linkage, whether one starts from the concept of the right to health, global social protection, or human security, the DAH architecture should provide equal
power in governance, between countries contributing
DAH and those implementing it, replacing the present
discretionary power of countries contributing DAH to decide what they want to support and what they do not want
to support. Dybul and Frenk’s discussion on the importance of reflecting the new global economic and political
reality argues for productive engagement with emerging
powers to redress past errors and move towards shared responsibility and mutual accountability [17]. Related to this
feature is the importance of country-specific policies,
meaning an architecture that is sufficiently flexible to
avoid ‘one size fits all’ solutions and to allow for countries
to think ambitiously in terms of funding.

Fig. 1 Global responsibilities for global health, from concepts to practice
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In the second linkage, civil society participation from
the inception of DAH-supported health care to the monitoring of its implementation is important, whichever
concept one employs. Under a right to health approach,
countries implementing DAH do so on behalf of their
inhabitants, who are the ultimate rights-holders. In a social protection scheme, beneficiaries are also participants. The human security approach aims to ensure the
basic security of all humans. These approaches are
fundamentally different from approaches based on humanitarianism, generosity or charity from one state to
another.
For the third linkage, the DAH architecture should
address problems in the volume of DAH. (Only a few
countries allocate the equivalent of 0.7 % of Gross
Domestic Product to international assistance, despite
repeated affirmations of this commitment). The longterm predictability of funding needs to be addressed.
Failure on these points has meant that countries implementing DAH reluctant to plan long term for fear that
the next funding cycle will result in shortfalls.
In the fourth linkage, there is a need to encourage
expanding domestic budgetary allocations in countries
implementing DAH. Expanding so-called ‘fiscal space’
requires both long-term DAH predictability and increasing domestic revenue. It requires moving beyond old
policies and agendas that defined fiscal space too narrowly. Growing domestic economies (and ensuring that
national treasuries benefit through increased tax revenue) is vital if the Abuja Declaration’s pledge – 15 % of
the budget for the health sector [22] – is to be met and
if met it is not to be 15 % of a very small amount.
On the fifth linkage, the DAH architecture must promote all elements of comprehensive efforts to improve
health, including national health systems (public health
and health care) capable of providing these efforts in an
equitable manner, without pitting one health problem
against another.

Ruger et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights (2015) 15:30

The sixth linkage relates to the Board of the GFATM,
in which countries contributing DAH and countries
implementing DAH are equally represented, and which
provides an example of partnership that is needed for
advancing global health. Transforming the current
GFATM into a Global Fund for Health would be a practical way to achieve this by resulting in board representation by all countries, not just those fighting AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria, thus reducing the inequities and
power disparities associated with the current DAH regime.
The seventh linkage involves preserving and reinforcing the so-called ‘Country Coordination Mechanisms’
(CCMs) in the new Global Fund for Health, which
would also allow giving civil society a voice in the DAH
architecture. While CCMs are not free of problems, they
are useful platforms for civil society participation, which
is necessary if we are to benefit from the voices and
perspectives of those whose health is ostensibly to be
improved through initiatives like a Global Fund for
Health [23]. The oversight bodies for ‘Sector-Wide
Approach’ (SWAPs), or related ‘basket funds’, do not
usually foresee such mechanisms, but the basic notion
could be revised going forward to include the participation of civil society.
For the eighth linkage, using estimates of the High
Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing
for Health Systems (Taskforce), the DAH architecture
would need to raise and allocate US$50 billion annually
[21]. Although the Taskforce did not use any of the
above mentioned concepts supporting a global responsibility for health, it is unlikely that the use of any of these
concepts would lead to a lower estimate. This level of
DAH should be predictable and reliable, and thus it
would be preferable that contributions be required, or at
least be subjected to peer pressure (for example, contributions to the International Development Association)
and mutual accountability. Achieving this level of DAH
would require about 0.1 % of the combined GDP of
high-income countries, or 15 % of the prior commitment to allocate 0.7 % of GDP to international aid (mirroring the commitment made in the Abuja Declaration).
Some fluctuations in DAH contributions will be inevitable, if only because the GDP of contributing countries
fluctuates. To create a buffer for fluctuations and to
spread unexpected shortfalls evenly over countries
implementing DAH, it seems advisable to pool all or the
majority of DAH in a Global Fund for Health.
The ninth linkage underscores that DAH should not
replace national health responsibility – the domestic
commitment to health justice [13, 15] – DAH should
encourage and support national health solidarity. Global
responsibility would not replace national responsibility.
Reasonable levels of national health morality in countries implementing DAH must therefore be agreed upon,
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and these countries would have to be accountable for
their progress in this respect, as much as countries
providing DAH would be held accountable for meeting
their commitments (see linkage 8). This should be
understood as an element of the partnership and a
provincial-global consensus on health morality [13]. The
resulting mutual commitment and the budget allocations
supporting it should convince international financial institutions that there is sufficient fiscal space for substantially increased government health expenditure. One
must be careful to avoid the reduced efforts in expanding domestic budgetary allocations, as the result of not
wanting to scale up public expenditure, while not forfeiting the available DAH. Pooling funds in a Global Fund
for Health should increase predictability (see linkage 8)
and increase the likelihood that DAH is truly additional
to domestic expenditure thus satisfying the objectives of
all partners [3].
Last but not least, for the tenth linkage the Global
Fund for Health would provide DAH for comprehensive
health efforts, not only for efforts against specific health
conditions like AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria which
may not result in strengthened public health systems or
improved general well-being for all.
Objections and future options

Some will argue that a Global Fund for Health may be desirable, but not essential. Could the International Health
Partnerships (plus Related Initiatives) and the ‘compacts’ it
aims for not provide all the features mentioned above?
We argue that it does not. Let us use the example of the
health compact, elaborated by the Ministry of Health of
Ethiopia, within the context of the IHP+. The cost is estimated at US$1.9 billion per year (for 80 million people,
still less than US$25 per person per year). This estimate
has been validated by the World Health Organization
(WHO), the World Bank, United Nations FPA, UNICEF
and several donor countries in the form of a ‘Joint Financial Arrangement’, according to which Ethiopia would
need to spend US$1.4 billion per year on health care in
addition to the US$0.5 billion it spends on health care at
present [24]. An effort like this would have to be sustained
over many years, if not decades, as it would not make
sense to increase the budget from US$0.5 billion to
US$1.9 billion and return to US$0.5 billion after a few
years. It seems unlikely that a US$1.4 billion DAH budget
will come from a patchwork of bilateral agreements in a
sufficiently reliable manner; even if it did so, it would be
an administrative quagmire.
In a practical example, if a Global Fund for Health
existed, then the compact would have been submitted to a
CCM (with a wider mandate and a larger composition),
where civil society would be able to participate in amending it. It would then go to an independent technical review
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panel, which would evaluate the compact on its technical
merits and verify if all elements of comprehensive primary
health care are included. If approved, the Board of the
Global Fund for Health – where countries providing DAH
and countries implementing DAH would be equally represented – would allow the secretariat to transform the
compact into a financial agreement, including the DAH
contribution and the domestic contribution. The Global
Fund for Health would need much more resources than
the present GFATM has; so an agreement on burdensharing between countries providing DAH would be a
prerequisite.
There are, in broad terms, two methods for designing
a DAH architecture that would meet these conditions.
One is to design something new, as noted above. The
other is to assess the current architecture and propose
incremental changes, towards an improved design.
Examining the current DAH architecture to find potential incremental changes, one can distinguish three
different types of DAH channels: global health initiatives, bilateral DAH channels, and World Bank funding.
Global health initiatives should adapt their governance
platforms in line with the requirements mentioned
above. They should seriously consider expanded mandates and mergers to consolidate the quantity. The existence of more than a hundred global health initiatives, or
even just twenty-three, depending on the definition one
employs [25], makes the architecture unnecessarily complex. Through a series of mergers, these initiatives could
themselves become a Global Fund for Health. Bilateral
DAH channels should question whether it is at all possible to move towards a relationship of equal partnership
in bilateral assistance and to include civil society in a
meaningful way. The flexibility bilateral DAH channels
provide will remain an essential feature of any DAH
architecture but for core DAH, such as the Ethiopia
compact, they should consider pooling more DAH into
a Global Fund for Health. The World Bank should
examine the kind of governance that currently steers the
DAH it provides – a Board of Governors, with votes in
accordance with countries’ economic power – and consider the creation of a specific governance body to oversee its DAH. DAH should conform to principles of
global health justice. To improve prospects for global
health equity, DAH should abandon the donor-recipient
dichotomy and replace it with equal respect for all person’s capabilities [26].
Sidibé has argued that the “the Global Fund is wellpositioned to evolve into a more stream-lined mechanism
for global health financing beyond AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria that could deliver greater coherence and equity
across the post-2015 landscape” [4]. Some have expressed
fears about a rapid expansion of the GFATM’s mandate
without prior guarantees about additional funding. Notably,
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one critic has written: “Without the necessary additional
funding, this proposition will just water down the Global
Fund’s current ability to deliver effectively and make an impact” [27]. However, supporters of a Global Fund for Health
point out that success in addressing priority diseases is “intrinsically fragile” in the absence of strong health systems
[28]. Both specific conditions and health systems must be
addressed to achieve long-term positive change. We agree,
however, that a GFATM with a wider mandate would need
a lot more funding to remain functional, but one might remember how the creation of the GFATM thirteen years
ago required a ‘leap of faith’, overcoming fears then that it
would mainly shift existing DAH, not add to it [29]. Socalled ‘AIDS exceptionalism’ was useful in spurring an alternative way of thinking about global health, but none of the
theoretical concepts undergirding global health can justify
prioritizing one disease above all others [30]. Global health
may require an additional ‘leap of faith’.

Conclusions
This article argues for advancing global responsibility for
global health through a Global Fund for Health which
builds on the exceptional response to the combined epidemic of AIDS, TB and Malaria, embodied by the
GFTAM. We argue that if the GFATM continues to
ground its ‘raison d’etre’ on exceptionality related to
three diseases, it risks going down together with the fall
of this exceptionality. However expanding the mandate
of the GFTAM to realize an expanded, reconceptualized
Global Fund for Health creates both an analytical quandary embedded in conceptual pluralism and a practical
dilemma. In addressing these issues we offer a logical
framework for moving from conceptual pluralism to
practical agreement on policy. We examine how the innovations flowing from this exceptional response can be
coupled with recent innovative ideas and concepts addressing global responsibility for global health. These recent propositions have an overlapping focus on shared
responsibility and mutual accountability suggesting there
is much room for practical agreement and the possibility
of moving from the conceptual level into policies and
practice that advance global health. We argue that supporting a Global Fund for Health would be a strong expression of support for global responsibility for global
health.
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